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Abstract  
This paper provides new evidence on individual preferences over annuities and lump sum 
payments based on hypothetical questions posed in the DNB Household Survey in 2005. 
Contrary to the majority of papers in the annuitization puzzle literature, this study allows 
to control explicitly for the subjective survival probability (SSP), a key driver of the 
decision about whether to annuitize or not as a perceived measure of longevity risk. We 
find that people expecting to live longer do claim to prefer the annuity. This finding is very 
robust to controlling for bequest motives. The relevance of this paper is twofold. First, it 
delivers an important empirical result on the role of the SSP that is still not directly tested 
in the literature. Second and more important, combined with the empirical evidence that 
on average individuals tend to systematically underestimate their life expectancy, the 
findings have strong policy implications. The annuitization puzzle may be alleviated by 
helping individuals in better assessing their longevity risk, rather than forcing their actions. 
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Life expectancy has improved substantially since the past decades and it has ac-
celerated in the recent years in all developed countries. In the Netherlands this
phenomenon is particularly strong for males. According to the most recent World
Health Statistics, life expectancy at birth has gone from 74 years in 1990 to 78 years
in 2008 for males, and from 80 years in 1990 to 82 years in 2008 for females. In the
same period, adult mortality rate, dened as the probability of dying between 15
and 60 years, has decreased from 11.6 percent to 7.8 percent for males, and from 6.7
percent to 5.7 percent for females. The declining female advantage in life expectancy
is observed in the US as well (Vallin, 1991) and largely driven by behavioral factors
(namely smoking) rather than biological factors (Pampel, 2002). In an increasingly
ageing society the need to provide with adequate insurance for late-life consumption
has become a high priority item in the agenda of the policy makers.
As the only contract that acts as insurance against longevity risk, the annuity
should always be chosen by risky individuals, even in presence of bequest motives
(Yaari 1965; Davido et al. 2005). Yet the empirical evidence from several countries
shows that only a minor fraction of individuals voluntarily buys annuities (James and
Song 2001; Johnson et al. 2004; Beatrice and Drinkwater 2004). The combination
of these two facts is known as the \annuitization puzzle".
The annuitization puzzle is a well documented phenomenon in the literature.
Several potential explanations have been discussed extensively in the literature.
They include both supply side reasons, e.g. highly priced annuities due to adverse
selection and administrative costs (Brown et al. 1999, 2001 for the US; Cannon and
Tonks 2004, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004 for the UK), and demand side motives, e.g.
intra-family risk sharing (Kotliko and Spivak 1981), liquidity constraints and large
out-of-pocket health expenditures (Palumbo 1999; De Nardi et al. 2010), preference
for bequests (Friedman and Warshawsky 1990; Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia
2006). More recently alternative typically behavioural explanations have been found,
e.g. framing eects or default eects (B utler and Teppa 2007; Agnew (et al.) 2008;
Brown et al. 2008).
This paper follows a dierent approach in that it focuses on longevity risk, a
driver that should be key in this type of choice and that has been missing in the
analysis so far. There are several ways to elicit information about individual life
expectancy, both indirectly, looking at parental longevity, or directly, by asking
subjective survival probabilities (SSP from now on). Both measures suer from
several drawbacks (e.g. focal points, rounding eects) but overall they seem to
3convey meaningful information on the individual longevity. There is evidence from
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) that SSP contain useful information on
survival expectations. They have been found to be correlated with known mortality
risk factors, to predict actual mortality, although less well once self-assessed health is
controlled for (Siegel et al. 2003), and are claimed to closely approximate actuarial
survival probabilities on average (Hurd and McGarry 1995; Smith et al. 2001; Hurd
and McGarry 2002). The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) data have
been used to test the predictive power of SSP for actual mortality and a systematic
underestimation of survival chances relative to those given in actuarial life tables
has been noted (Banks et al. 2004; O'Donnell et al. 2008). More recently, SSP for
the Netherlands have been used to analyze their impact on retirement intentions
and actual behaviour (van Solinge and Henkens 2010).
In this paper we use subjective survival probabilities as measures of perceived
longevity risk in a simple model for individual preferences over annuities and lump
sum payments based on hypothetical questions posed in the DNB Household Survey
in 2005. We nd that people expecting to live longer do claim to prefer the annuity.
This nding is very robust to controlling for bequest motives, that turns out to be
the other main determinant for the choice of lump sum payments. The relevance
of this paper is twofold. First, it delivers an important empirical result on the
role of the SSP that is still not directly tested in the literature. Second and more
important, combined with the empirical evidence that on average individuals tend
to systematically underestimate their life expectancy, the ndings have strong policy
implications. The annuitization puzzle may be alleviated by helping individuals in
better assessing their longevity risk, rather than forcing their nal actions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the empir-
ical analysis. Particular emphasis is devoted to the subjective survival probability,
on how it has been elicited and on how it relates to the main individual background
and socio-economic characteristics. Section 3 describes the empirical model with a
focus on the dependent variable and the sample restrictions. Section 4 reports and
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The data
The empirical analysis is based on data collected from the households participating
in the so-called DNB Household Survey (DHS). The DHS, formerly known as the
CentER Savings Survey, is an annual panel survey of more than 2,000 households
in the Netherlands that started in 1993. The panel is run at Tilburg University by
4CentERdata. Panel members are aged 16 years and older. In case of attrition, Cen-
tERdata recruits new participants to maintain the panel size and to keep the panel
as representative as possible on a number of relevant background characteristics
such as age, gender, income, education, and region of residence. The DHS dataset
further contains detailed information on employment status, pension arrangements,
accommodation, wealth, as well as health status, and psychological concepts. The
dataset thus provides the opportunity to combine both economic and psychological
aspects of nancial behavior.
2.1 The subjective survival probability (SSP)
This paper focuses on longevity risk and its impact on the choice between an annuity
and a lump sum payment. In this study we use survey questions on subjective
survival probabilities available for 2005. We then merge these data with the 2005
DHS wave in order to have all the relevant information present in the survey.
The life-expectancy questions given to the respondents have the following format
which strictly follows the one used in the HRS as well as in the ELSA:
Please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means \no chance at
all" and 10 means \absolutely certain".
SSPXX : How likely is it that you will attain (at least) the age of XX?
The target age (denoted by XX) depends on the current age of the respondent. In
particular, SSP75 is presented to people aged between 16 and 64; SSP80 is presented
to people aged between 16 and 69; SSP85 is presented to people aged between 65
and 75; SSP90 is presented to people aged between 70 and 80; SSP95 is presented
to people aged between 75 and 85; SSP100 is presented to people aged between 80
and 90. Since the answers are on a 0-10 scale, we can interpret value 1 as \1 to 10
percent likely to attain (at least) the age of XX", value 2 as \11 to 20 percent likely
to attain (at least) the age of XX", and so forth. This format is very similar to that
used by van Solinge and Henkens (2010), even if they ask this probability on a 1 to
5 scale, and they only ask for the target age of 75. It is also important to note that
by question design these probabilities are conditional on being alive at a certain age.
Table 1 presents the main summary statistics and Figure 1 shows the histograms
for each subjective survival probability. A careful analysis of these statistics is
needed in order to assess the informative content and to validate the overall quality
of the various SSPs.
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here
5The number of observations decreases severely as the target age increases, as a
consequence of the routing in the question design. However, we can infer that the
several SSPs have a consistent and informative content. We note that both the mean
and the median value of the SSPs monotonically decline with respect to the target
age. The standard deviation is highest for SSP90 and SSP95, lowest for SSP100 and
rather stable for the remaining SSPs. Several dispersion measures, like the variance
and the standard error of the mean, provide some evidence that the respondents
report lower chances to attain higher target ages, but they are also more uncertain
about that, except for reaching age 100.
The distributions are all non-symmetric but dier with respect to their skewness,
which is negative for the three lowest target ages and positive for the three highest
target ages. The most left-skewed distribution, with relatively few low values, and
the most right-skewed distribution, with relatively few high values, are those for the
extreme target ages, namely SPP75 and SPP100, respectively. This means that it
is most likely to attain age 75 and least likely to attain age 100. In addition, the
skewness monotonically increases with the target age; for SSP85 the distribution
has roughly zero skewness and is unimodal (mean = median = mode = 5).
Finally, in order to assess whether the data are peaked or at relative to a normal
distribution we report the kurtosis. We observe that the histogram with the highest
kurtosis is that for SSP75, with a distinct peak near the mean value.
2.2 SSPs and socio-economic variables
The DHS contains a great amount of information on several background as well as
socio-economic characteristics, both at the individual and at the household level. In
this section we make an overview of how the SSPs relate to some of these variables, in
particular to those for which it is reasonable to expect a meaningful relationship. We
know for example from mortality tables that females have a higher life expectancy
than male, on average. Similarly, there is some empirical international evidence
about a positive correlation between life expectancy and education level, as well as
nancial situation. We also expect SSP to be associated with health status, both
subjectively reported and derived from more objective illnesses. With these ideas
in mind, we select gender, education level, self-assessed health (SAH from now on),
long-term illness, smoking behaviour, drinking habits, and household income. Table
2 reports the mean values of each SSP by background and socio-economic factors.
Table 2 about here
6The ndings for gender are rather mixed. Women tend to report higher survival
probabilities than man on average, but only in one case out of six this dierence
is statistically signicant (at the 5-percent level). Moreover, in two cases (namely
SSP85 and SSP90) this dierence is negative, though not signicant. This ndings
contrasts with international evidence of women living longer than men, on average.
We thus devote a deeper thought on this in the next subsection.
The evidence for education level is more consistent, as the respondents with
better education tend to have higher survival probabilities on average for all target
ages up to 90. This health protective role of education is in line with Cutler, Lleras-
Muney and Vogl (2010). In addition, the dierence for SSP75 is strongly signicant
(1-percent level) whereas that for SSP80 is less signicant (10-percent level). For the
two highest target ages, the dierence turns out to be positive, and also signicant
at the 5-percent level for SSP95. This nding is rather counterintuitive, but could
be (partly) explained by selective mortality.
A much more consistent picture is found for self-assessed health. For all target
ages the individuals reporting good or very good SAH systematically report higher
average survival probabilities than those with fair, bad or very bad SAH. The dier-
ences are always strongly signicant. Similar evidence is found for long-term illness.
The respondents who claim to suer for LT illness signicantly report lower survival
probabilities than those who claim to have no LT illness, on average.
Both smoking and drinking behaviour seems to be only weakly related to SSPs.
In both cases higher survival probabilities are reported by the respondents who
declare to be non-smokers and to drink no alcohol, but the dierence is strongly
signicant (at the 1-percent level) for the two lowest target ages only.
Finally, the SSP measures do not seem to be related at all with household income.
We experimented with several cut-o points in household income, but the ndings
of no correlation are rather robust. This nding seems to be in line with Deaton's
ndings that as far as controllable vs. non-controllable diseases (e.g. cardiovascular
vs. all cancer types) is concerned, among adults income is not important, but
education is. In particular Deaton nds that education is health protective for
controllable diseases only, whereas income is never health protective.
2.3 Subjective vs. actuarial survival probabilities
Another aspect that should be taken into account in assessing the quality of the
SSPs is to relate them to actuarial survival probabilities. Do individuals perceive
their longevity risk (and consequently form their subjective probabilities) correctly?
7To answer this question we compare the subjective survival probabilities from survey
data to the actuarial survival probabilities from ocial mortality tables.
Actuarial survival probabilities are computed from mortality rates provided by
Statistics Netherlands (CBS, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). Since the DHS
data refer to 2005, we consider the 2005 actuarial mortality rates, by age and gender.
In order to make the two series of survival probabilities comparable, we construct
the subjective survival probabilities implied by the SSPs by transforming the SSPs
from the 1-10 scale into percentages.
Figure 2 reports the two series of statistics for the survival probabilities of reach-
ing (at least) age 75. We only consider individuals aged 50+, for whom this kind
of comparison is not aected by potential cohort eects. The upper panel refers to
females; the lower panel refers to males.
The gure clearly shows that females underestimate their survival probabilities
at all ages. For some ages this underestimation is quantitatively very strong (around
25 percentage points for age 52 and age 60). Similar evidence is found in the HRS
data for United States by Perozek (2008).
Though evidence of substantial misperception of longevity risk for males as well
is there, males seems to assess their survival probabilities better than females.
The fact that males have a better clue of their true survival probabilities explains
the surprisingly mixed picture that emerges from Table 2 above. The demographic
trend of women living longer than men, on average, is not mirrored in the reported
subjective survival probabilities by gender mainly as a consequence of the stronger
misperception of the actuarial survival probabilities by females than by males.
Overall, the empirical evidence documented so far seems to point to the con-
clusion that the SSPs, though neither perfect nor exempt from limitations, convey
reasonably meaningful information on individual longevity, and relate relatively well
with a number of background and socio-economic characteristics, on average. These
ndings are fully in line with van Solinge and Henkens (2010).
At the same time, the comparison between subjective and actuarial survival
probabilities shows that individuals systematically underestimate their longevity, in
some cases very strongly, especially for females. These ndings are again fully in
line with international gures (e.g. O'Donnell et al. 2008 for UK).
Figure 2 about here
83 The empirical model
3.1 The dependent variable
The dependent variable in our models is derived from hypothetical questions on
preferences over a full annuity or a partial lump sum payment upon retirement.
The rst question reads as follows:
Imagine you are 65 years old, and you are receiving A C 1,000 per month in state
pension. Suppose you were given the choice to lower that benet by half, to A C 500
per month. This one-half benet reduction would continue for as long as you live. In
return you would be given a one-time, lump sum payment of [A C 87,000 (for females)
/ A C 72,000 (for males)].
Would you take the A C 1,000 monthly benet for life, or the lower monthly benet
combined with the lump sum payment?
This initial question is asked to all respondents in the sample, irrespective of
their working status and for all ages. At this stage, the respondents are given a
fair deal. The lump sum payment is computed to be actuarially fair and thus the
amount diers by gender: Females are confronted with a payment of 87,000 euros,
males with 72,000 euros. The choice is then between a full annuity and a partial
lump sum payment. For simplicity, from now on we omit the words \full" and
\partial" when referring to the annuity and the lump sum payment, respectively.
However, it is important to keep in mind, especially when interpreting the empirical
results, that the other polar case of full lump sum payment is never oered to the
individuals in this exercise.
Depending on the answer given to this question, the respondents are asked a
follow-up question, where the lump sum payments is made more (less) attractive
to those individuals who had preferred the annuity (the lump sum payment) in the
rst round. Figure 3 reports the structure of the question sequence. Table 3 reports
the mean values of the choice between the annuity and the lump sum payments for
the full sample, as well as by gender and by the presence of children.
Figure 3 and Table 3 about here
The annuity is preferred by slightly more than half of respondents (54 percent)
in Question 1.1 Conditional on having chosen the annuity in Question 1, then the
1This is in line with Brown (2001) who nds that 48 percent of the HRS sample reports that
they will annuitize their DC plan.
9annuity is still largely preferred to the lump sum payment in Question 2a (69 percent
vs. 31 percent, respectively). Similarly, conditional on having chosen the lump
sum in Question 1, then the annuity is preferred only by 40 percent of individuals
in Question 2b. There is evidence of persistent preferences as only 17 percent of
individuals switch from the annuity to the lump sum payment (172 out of 1,027),
and only 18 percent of individuals switch from the lump sum payment to the annuity
(185 out of 1,027).
The overall picture does not change when the choice is made by gender and by
the presence of children. We notice however that males and respondents without
children prefer the annuity the most (57 and 56 percent respectively) in Question
1. Both the dierence with females and the dierence with people with no children
are signicant at the 5-percent level in Question 1. No signicant dierences by
gender or by having children is found for the follow-up questions. We also made
the analysis (not reported in the table) by the presence of partner and household
income: the dierences are non signicant.
It is important to notice that the framing of this question is not fully \neutral"
as it involves an explicit opting-out option (a lump sum payment in place of half
annuitized pension wealth). This set up was used in the 2004 wave of the HRS. In
the 2008 wave of the HRS a somewhat dierent wording was used in order to elicit
the information about willingness to annuitize:
Imagine you are 65 years old, and you are receiving $1,000 per month in Social
Security benets. Imagine that you are currently getting $1,000 per month in Social
Security benets. Suppose you had a choice: either you could keep that $1,000
monthly benet for life, or you could exchange it for a monthly benet half that size,
$500 per month for life, plus youd get a one-time, lump sum payment.
What is the smallest lump-sum that you would be willing to accept in exchange for
reducing your lifetime benet by $500 per month? $ .... Amount
We model the choice between the annuity and the lump sum payment by a
standard binary choice model, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the
annuity is chosen in Question 1, 0 if the lump sum payment is preferred in that
same question. We then perform simple probit regressions.
3.2 Sample restrictions
Contrary to B utler and Teppa (2007), who provide with empirical evidence on actual
choices, this paper is based on purely hypothetical choices between the annuity and
the lump sum. In order to make this choice as close to reality as possible, we restrict
10our analysis primarily on the subsample of the respondents aged less than 65 years
old. This subgroup consists of 80 percent of the initial sample, and includes the
individuals for whom this choice, thought hypothetical, might be more meaningful.
In real circumstances, in fact, this choice is typically given upon retirement or some
years prior to the retirement date. We therefore exclude the oldest fraction of the
sample population altogether, e.g. those aged 70+,2 and we keep the individuals
aged 65-69 to perform some robustness analysis.
Another dimension we restrict our attention upon is the question sequence. We
conduct most of our empirical analysis on the initial, reported above, question only,
and use the follow-up questions for an extension and robustness checks. The idea
behind this strategy lies on the fact that Question 1 only in Figure 3 presents an
actuarially fair deal to the respondents. In order to assess the role of the longevity
risk on this choice it is very important to start with an environment where one
option is not preferrable to the other due to opportunity biases. On the other hand,
it is straightforward to think that in case an individual knows for sure that she will
not survive until a certain age the lump sum payment is always to prefer even if it
is not fair compared to the annuity.
4 Empirical ndings
4.1 Does the annuity demand respond to longevity risk?
Table 4a reports the rst set of empirical ndings. The \baseline" specication in-
cludes longevity risk (via the subjective survival probability to age 75, SSP75), age
(in quadratic form) and gender (as a female indicator), and other forms of old age
provision (through a dummy variable for the presence of other pension arrangements
besides the standard pension built up through one's employer). In particular, the
dummy takes value 1 if any of the following arrangements have been purchased: an-
nuities, life policies, extra pension rights via the employer, extra periodical payments
via the employer, other pension funds.
Two additional specications aim at controlling for bequest motives. We refer
to them as the \augmented" and the \restricted" specications, respectively. The
augmented specication contains the variable \Bequest" derived from the following
question:
What is the chance that you will leave an inheritance (including possessions and
2They represent 13 percent of the initial sample.
11valuable items) of more than A C 10,000?
The restricted specication replicates the augmented version but only to the
subgroup of individuals who answered option (1) or option (2) to the following
question:
Please indicate which of the following four statements about parents leaving a
bequest to their children would be closest to your own opinion about this.
(1) If our children would take good care of us when we get old, we would like to leave
them a considerable bequest;
(2) We would like to leave our children a considerable bequest, irrespective of the
way they will take care of us when we are old;
(3) We have no preconceived plans about leaving a bequest to our children;
(4) We do not intend to leave a bequest to our children;
(5) None of the above-mentioned statements.
Table 4b slightly diers from Table 4a. In all three specications we replace
the variable \Other pension arrangements" by the purchase of life policies, which
is one of the components included in the replaced variable. The idea behind this
alternative specication is to assess the role of life policies alone as probably the
most natural nancial instrument that allows to cover the longevity risk.
Table 4a and Table 4b about here
The baseline scenario shows that in absence of bequest motives the individual
choice between the annuity and the lump sum payment responds strongly signif-
icantly to the longevity risk and with the expected positive coecient sign. The
respondents reporting higher probabilities to survive (at least) until 75 years are
more likely to opt for the annuity, at the 1-percent signicance level. The marginal
eect is such that for any additional 10 percent-point increase in the SSP75 the
probability to annuitize increases by 2.6 percent on average. As an example, if the
chance to be alive at age 75 increases from 30 to 40 percent, the probability to choose
the annuity increases by 2.6 percent. An individual whose survival expectations at
age 75 go from 0 percent to 100 percent increases her probability to annuitize by 26
percent.
Age enters signicantly (at the 5-percent level) with both its terms. The age
function for choosing the annuity is U-shaped and reaches a minimum at age 38.
This nding is in line with the analysis conducted on real choices over the lump-
sum versus annuity payout made by retirement-age participants in two Fortune
12500 dened benet plans (one a traditional nal-average-pay plan, the other a cash
balance plan) in the US, where older participants were much more likely to annuitize
than their younger counterparts. Approximately half of the participants aged 70
and older chose an annuity compared with less than 20 percent for participants
between ages 55 and 60 (Mottola and Utkus, 2007). We estimate that a one-year
increase in age leads to a marginal increase in the probability to annuitize by 3
percent, on average. Mottola and Utkus (2007) found that a ve-year increase in
age is associated with an eight (seven) percentage point increase in the likelihood
to annuitize in the traditional plan (in the cash balance plan).
Females annuitize signicantly less than males: being a female decreases the
probability to annuitize by 8.2 percent, at the margin. The higher cash out rates for
women are fully consistent with the ndings of B utler and Teppa (2007) and can be
mostly explained by the availability of alternative sources of income and insurance
(husband, family). Having other pension arrangements reduces the probability to
annuitize. This nding is in line with our priors because alternative forms of savings
devoted specically to cover the longevity risk may act as substitutes for annuities.
However, the signicance level is rather low (10 percent) and the marginal eect is
6.2 percent.
Controlling for the probability of leaving a bequest (augmented specication)
does not aect the impact of the subjective survival probability: the individuals
expecting higher probability of being alive (at least) at age 75 are more likely to
annuitize. The marginal eect of SSP75 remains robust (2.5 percent for every 10
percent change in SSP75), the signicance level is somewhat less strong than in the
baseline specication but still satisfactory (5-percent level). The age eect vanishes
away, but gender and the presence of alternative pension arrangements stay robust,
with slightly larger marginal eects (9.4 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively). The
extra variable for bequest motives does not play any signicant role.
When rening the concept of leaving a bequest and restricting the sample to
the individuals who answered the last question above mentioned, despite the severe
drop in the number of observations, the bequest motive gets signicant (at the 5-
percent level) and with the expected negative sign. At the same time, the longevity
risk remains signicant (although only at the 1-percent level) and with the positive
sign. All the other regressors loose their predictive power. It seems that the choice
between an annuity and a (partial) lump sum payment is mainly driven by the
longevity risk (with a more than double marginal eect) and by the bequest motive.
These two drivers are opposite to each other, and the empirical ndings show that
the bequest motive does not dominate the longevity risk. These ndings are very
13robust to replacing \Other pension arrangements" with \Life policies" (see Table
4b). The SSP75 remains very signicant even when controlling for the intention to
leave a bequest and its marginal eect is always larger in all three specications. The
desire to bequeath is the other strongly signicant determinant on the annuitization
choice.
We ran alternative specications by including additional background character-
istics (e.g. level of education, marital status, number of children), nancial assets
(e.g. household income and household wealth, both net and gross), and health vari-
ables (e.g. self-assessed health, number of visits to the medical doctor). All these
controls turned out to be totally insignicant, but rather correlated with the sub-
jective survival probabilities. We then decided not to report all these regressions,
but rather concentrate on the above mentioned specications.
4.2 Do dierent time horizons in measuring longevity risk
matter?
The empirical evidence described in the previous subsection is based on the sub-
jective survival probabilities to age 75 (SSP75). However, our data asks the re-
spondents aged less than 70 years old a similar question for a slightly longer time
horizon, namely about the subjective survival probabilities to age 80 (SSP80). In
other words, for the subsample of individuals aged less than 65 we focus upon both
questions on longevity risk are available.
Table 5a and Table 5b present the empirical ndings when controlling for this
longer time horizon (SSP80 instead of SSP75). The model specications are also
the same as the ones used in Table 4a and Table 4b respectively. The aim of this
exercise is to investigate whether dierent time horizons have a dierent impact
on the annuitization choice. For this reason, the models in Table 5a and Table 5b
have been estimated for the same subsample of respondents as for Tables 4a and 4b,
namely the respondents aged less than 65.
Table 5a and Table 5b about here
The picture that derives from this set of regressions is fairly similar to the one
presented in the previous subsection. The SSP80 does a proper job in explaining the
choice between the annuity and the lump sum payment, as well as the background
characteristics and the nancial variables. However we note that in the restricted
specication the longevity risk looses now its signicance whereas the bequest vari-
able keeps being signicant. Of course the very small number of observations induces
14the reader to be very careful in drawing strong conclusions. However, there is some
evidence that making the survival horizon longer (e.g. asking the survival probabil-
ity in a 5-year longer period) hampers its predictive power. This nding is deemed
to be investigated more deeply, as it may create some concerns for policy makers
who are ultimately faced with the individual risk of reaching very high ages.
As robustness check, we perform the same analysis also for the subsample of
individuals aged less than 70 for which we have the full answers to SSP80. The
overall picture does not change. However, we do not report a separate table for
space reasons.
4.3 Does the distance to the retirement age matter?
As mentioned earlier, in real circumstances the choice between an annuity and a
lump sum payment is typically to be taken upon retirement. In principle this choice
is restricted to a particular subgroup of the eligible population, that could act as a
sort of target group. We have already documented in the previous sections that the
respondents' age play a role, sometimes very signicant, on this choice. The survey
nature of our data allows to investigate further along this dimension. In this section
we address the question whether the individuals choose dierently depending on
how close they are to the retirement age, which is 65 years old.
We select two subsamples of respondents for which we have a reasonable number
of observations: those aged 49-64, and those aged 55-64. For each of these subsam-
ples, we perform the baseline specication under three variants: without SSP, with
SSP75, and with SSP80. The results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6 about here
We observe that the two selected subgroups do not seem to be very heteroge-
neous. In both cases the choice consistently and signicantly depends on the SSPs.
Females are more likely to cash out than males in both subgroups, but signicantly
(though only at the 10-percent level) for the 49-64 respondents. Though the age
variables are not signicant, we note that the age functions for the two subgroups
are very dierent. Figure 4 show that the age functions are inverse U-shaped for
those aged 49-64, and U-shaped for those aged 55-64.
Figure 4 about here
154.4 Are annuity people dierent from lump sum people?
The analysis conducted so far has been based on Question 1 only in Figure 3. How-
ever we also observe the choice the respondents make in the follow-up questions. In
order to investigate the robustness of the SSPs as important, if not the main, driving
determinants of the choice between the annuity and the lump sum payment we now
run probit analysis with two slightly dierent dependent variables. In one case we
code as 1 those individuals who choose the annuity option in both rounds, namely
both in Question 1 and in Question 2a. For simplicity we label these respondents
as \annuity people" . In the other case we code as 1 those individuals who choose
the lump sum option in both rounds, namely both in Question 1 and in Question
2b. For symmetry we label these respondents as \lump sum people" . For both
specications we run the augmented and the restricted specication, with SSP75
and SSP80. Table 7a and Table 7b report the results for this set of regressions.
Table 7a and Table 7b about here
As before, both the annuity people and the lump sum people consistently choose
in line with their subjective survival probabilities. Both SSP75 and SSP80 aect
positively the annuity choice and negatively the lump sum payment choice. The
usual signicance levels are always satised, with the only exception of the restricted
specication for the annuity choice. In addition, bequest motives appear to be the
other most relevant determinant of both the annuity and the lump sum choice. The
opposite coecient signs for the two subgroups are in line with ex-ante predictions.
The respondents who intend to leave a bequest do annuitize less and do cash out
more. In both cases the value of the marginal eect is the same and rather small
(0.003), and the signicance is at the 1-percent level.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on individual preferences over annuities and lump
sum payments based on hypothetical questions posed in the DNB Household Survey
in 2005. Contrary to the majority of papers in the annuitization puzzle literature,
this study allows to control explicitly for the subjective survival probability (SSP),
a key driver of the decision about whether to annuitize or not as a measure of
perceived longevity risk.
The main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we nd that the SSPs
convey reasonably meaningful information on individual longevity, and relate rel-
atively well with a number of background and socio-economic characteristics, on
16average. Secondly, individuals make their choices consistently in line with their sur-
vival expectations. In particular, the people expecting to live longer do claim to
prefer the annuity. This nding is very robust to a number of alternative specica-
tions, including regressions where bequests motives are explicitly taken into account.
Overall, the choice seems to be signicantly driven by these two opposite forces. All
the other controls are totally irrelevant for the choice: Education level, but also
household income (net and gross), household wealth (net and gross), the presence of
(dependent) children, marital status do not have any signicant role on the choice
between the annuity and the lump sum payment.
We plan to extend this paper in a number of directions. A deeper understanding
of the role of the SSPs is deemed to be necessary. In order to do so, we are going
to investigate the eect of longer horizons by asking the individuals for which the
choice between the annuity and the lump sum is potentially relevant the subjective
probability of reaching very high target ages, like 90, or 95, or even longer. The
idea is to test whether the ndings of a very strong role of these SSPs remain robust
when far o ages are involved. This is ultimately the longevity risk policy makers
are concerned about. While writing this version of the paper, the new questions are
being elded.
Another direction we intend to undertake is to frame the choice between the
annuity and the lump sum dierently and test for the presence of framing/wording
eects. This experiment is left for future research.
The relevance of this paper is twofold. First, it delivers an important empirical
result on the role of the SSP that is still not directly tested in the literature about
the annuitization puzzle. In addition, given that on average individuals tend to
systematically underestimate their life expectancy, the nding that people choose the
annuity consistently with respect to their survival probabilities have strong policy
implications. The annuitization puzzle may be alleviated by helping individuals in
better assessing their perceived longevity risk, rather than forcing their actions.
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20Table 1: Summary statistics for SSPs
Statistics SSP75 SSP80 SSP85 SSP90 SSP95 SSP100
Mean 6.90 5.68 5.24 3.63 2.64 0.57
Median 7 6 5 4 2 0
Std.Dev. 1.93 2.26 2.13 2.40 2.35 0.76
Variance 3.75 5.11 4.56 5.79 5.54 0.59
Std.Err.(mean) 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.17
Skewness -0.91 -0.49 -0.08 0.23 0.84 0.86
Kurtosis 4.14 2.87 2.71 2.33 3.26 2.29
N.Obs. 931 1018 174 138 68 19
21Table 2: SSPs and socio-economic factors (mean values)
Variable SSP75 SSP80 SSP85 SSP90 SSP95 SSP100
Gender
Female 6.92 5.82 5.11 3.22 3.62 0.67
Male 6.87 5.56 5.31 3.77 2.52 0.56
Dierence 0.05 0.26 ** -0.20 -0.55 1.10 0.11
Education level
Low level 6.60 5.50 5.01 3.34 3.34 0.83
Mid/high level 6.99 5.74 5.37 3.78 2.28 0.46
Dierence -0.38 *** -0.23 * -0.36 -0.43 1.05 ** 0.37
SAH
Good/Very good 7.19 5.98 5.74 4.25 3.11 0.57
Fair/Bad/Very bad 5.78 4.58 3.91 1.86 1.79 0.58
Dierence 1.41 *** 1.40 *** 1.83 *** 2.39 *** 1.32 ** -0.01
LT Illness
Yes 6.36 5.17 4.90 3.08 2.37 0.60
No 7.08 5.86 5.47 4.01 2.84 0.56
Dierence -0.72 *** -0.69 *** -0.57 ** -0.92 ** -0.46 0.04
Smoke
Yes 6.48 5.24 5.08 3.72 4.00 0.00
No 7.05 5.82 5.26 3.61 2.53 0.64
Dierence -0.56 *** -0.58 *** -0.17 0.10 1.46 -0.64
Drink
Yes 6.24 4.93 5.11 2.16 1.75 0.00
No 6.94 5.73 5.24 3.69 2.70 0.64
Dierence -0.69 *** -0.79 *** -0.13 -1.53 * -0.95 -0.64
Household income
Larger than 40,000 euros 6.86 5.59 5.29 3.60 2.63 0.64
Lower than 40,000 euros 6.82 5.72 5.25 3.74 2.85 0.40
Dierence 0.32 -0.13 0.04 -0.14 -0.22 0.24
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
22Table 3: Mean values of the choice between annuity and lump sum payments
Choice Question 1 Question 2a Question 2b
Percent N.Obs. Percent N.Obs. Percent N.Obs.
Full sample
Annuity 54.24 557 68.56 375 40.13 185
Lump sum 45.76 470 31.44 172 59.87 276
Total 100 1,027 100 547 100 461
Gender
Female
Annuity 50.24 213 68.12 141 37.02 77
Lump sum 49.76 211 31.88 66 62.98 131
Total 100 424 100 207 100 208
Male
Annuity 57.05 344 68.82 234 42.69 108
Lump sum 42.95 259 31.18 106 57.31 145
Total 100 603 100 547 100 253
Dierence -6.81 ** -0.70 -5.67
Children
With children
Annuity 50 163 66.46 105 40.99 66
Lump sum 50 163 33.54 53 59.01 95
Total 100 326 100 158 100 161
No children
Annuity 56.21 394 69.41 270 39.67 119
Lump sum 43.79 307 30.59 119 60.33 181
Total 100 701 100 389 100 300
Dierence -6.21 ** -2.95 1.31
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
23Table 4a: Annuity choice and SSP75 - probit estimates
Variable Baseline Augmented Restricted
Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP75 0.064 *** 0.062 ** 0.141 *
[0.026] [0.025] [0.056]
(0.024) (0.026) (0.081)
Age -0.075 ** -0.059 -0.034
[-0.030] [-0.023] [-0.014]
(0.037) (0.039) (0.146)
Age squared 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Female -0.206 ** -0.236 ** -0.252
[-0.082] [-0.094] [-0.099]
(0.094) (0.102) (0.347)
Other pension arrangements -0.155 * -0.196 ** -0.051
[-0.062] [-0.078] [-0.020]
(0.094) (0.101) (0.319)
Bequest -0.002 -0.014 **
[-0.001] [-0.005]
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.002 0.765 0.450
(0.821) (0.896) (3.351)
Log-likelihood -538.159 -471.579 -47.028
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.033 0.103
N.Obs. 799 705 76
Minimum annuity at age 38 35 26
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in the rst round
Specication (I) : subsample 22-64 without bequest motive
Specication (II) : subsample 22-64 with bequest motive
Specication (III) : subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
24Table 4b: Annuity choice and SSP75 - probit estimates
Variable Baseline Augmented Restricted
Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP75 0.074 *** 0.072 ** 0.239 **
[0.030] [0.029] [0.094]
(0.029) (0.031) (0.081)
Age -0.087 * -0.078 0.005
[-0.035] [-0.031] [0.002]
(0.047) (0.051) (0.194)
Age squared 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Female -0.293 *** -0.340 *** -0.669
[-0.116] [-0.135] [-0.261]
(0.114) (0.122) (0.450)
Life policies -0.290 * -0.333 * -0.971
[-0.115] [-0.132] [-0.367]
(0.302) (0.175) (0.602)
Bequest -0.002 -0.016 **
[-0.001] [-0.006]
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant 1.234 1.145 0.718
(1.054) (1.158) (4.405)
Log-likelihood -376.981 -333.780 -29.473
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.041 0.222
N.Obs. 563 503 55
Minimum annuity at age 39 38 -
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in the rst round
Specication (I) : subsample 22-64 without bequest motive
Specication (II) : subsample 22-64 with bequest motive
Specication (III) : subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
25Table 5a: Annuity choice and SSP80 - probit estimates
Variable Baseline Augmented Restricted
Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP80 0.060 *** 0.054 ** 0.077
[0.024] [0.022] [0.030]
(0.020) (0.022) (0.065)
Age -0.075 ** -0.059 -0.028
[-0.030] [-0.023] [-0.011]
(0.036) (0.039) (0.146)
Age squared 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Female -0.221 ** -0.246 ** -0.172
[-0.088] [-0.098] [-0.068]
(0.094) (0.102) (0.342)
Other pension arrangements -0.151 -0.189 * 0.007
[-0.060] [-0.075] [0.003]
(0.094) (0.101) (0.329)
Bequest -0.002 -0.013 **
[0.029] [-0.005]
(0.001) (0.006)
Constant 1.110 0.871 0.739
(0.805) (0.883) (3.356)
Log-likelihood -537.285 -471.324 -47.878
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.034 0.167
N.Obs. 799 705 76
Minimum annuity at age 38 35 24
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in the rst round
Specication (I) : subsample 22-64 without bequest motive
Specication (II) : subsample 22-64 with bequest motive
Specication (III) : subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
26Table 5b: Annuity choice and SSP80 - probit estimates
Variable Baseline Augmented Restricted
Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP80 0.066 *** 0.053 ** 0.113
[0.026] [0.021] [0.044]
(0.024) (0.026) (0.073)
Age -0.055 * -0.077 0.016
[-0.034] [-0.031] [0.001]
(0.047) (0.051) (0.193)
Age squared 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0001]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Female -0.304 *** -0.345 *** -0.437
[-0.121] [-0.137] [-0.172]
(0.114) (0.122) (0.426)
Life policies -0.274 * -0.319 * 0.806
[-0.109] [-0.127] [-0.310]
(0.165) (0.176) (0.594)
Bequest -0.002 -0.016 **
[-0.001] [-0.006]
(0.002) (0.007)
Constant 1.316 1.299 -0.173
(1.043) (1.149) (4.379)
Log-likelihood -376.502 -334.418 -31.494
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.039 0.169
N.Obs. 563 503 55
Minimum annuity at age 39 37 -
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in the rst round
Specication (I) : subsample 22-64 without bequest motive
Specication (II) : subsample 22-64 with bequest motive
Specication (III) : subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
27Table 6: Annuity choice, age and SSPs - probit estimates
Variable Baseline - Aged 49-64 Baseline - Aged 55-64
Coecient Coecient Coecient Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP75 0.079 ** 0.039 **
[0.030] [0.015]
(0.038) (0.049)
SSP80 0.102 *** 0.081 **
[0.039] [0.030]
(0.030) (0.038)
Age 0.149 0.160 0.176 -1.122 -1.017 -0.732
[0.057] [0.061] [0.067] [-0.422] [-0.383] [-0.275]
(0.507) (0.508) (0.510) (1.575) (1.582) (1.590)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.009 0.006
[-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Female -0.277 * -0.274 * -0.303 * -0.096 -0.093 -0.107
[-0.107] [-0.106] [-0.116] [-0.036] [-0.035] [-0.040]
(0.156) (0.157) (0.159) (0.197) (0.197) (0.199)
Other -0.176 -0.226 -0.219 -0.142 -0.167 -0.180
pension arr. [-0.067] [-0.086] [-0.084] [-0.054] [-0.063] [-0.068]
(0.156) (0.159) (0.159) (0.201) (0.204) (0.204)
Constant -4.311 -4.989 -5.414 33.479 30.204 21.705
(14.298) (14.325) (14.395) (46.829) (47.066) (47.314)
Log-likelihood -208.169 -206.045 -202.485 -128.257 -127.945 -126.020
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.022 0.039 0.005 0.007 0.022
N.Obs. 315 315 315 196 196 196
Max/min. - 63 (M) 62 (M) 59 (m) 59 (m) 59 (m)
annuity at age
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in the rst round
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level
* denotes signicant at 10-percent level
28Table 7a: Annuity or lump sum choice and SSPs - probit estimates
Variable Annuity = 1 Lump sum = 1
Augm. Restr. Augm. Restr.
Coecient Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP75 0.061 ** 0.074 -0.041 * -0.218 **
[0.021] [0.020] [-0.013] [-0.060]
(0.025) (0.087) (0.025) (0.089)
Age -0.026 0.410 * 0.090 ** 0.004
[-0.009] [0.108] [0.028] [0.001]
(0.038) (0.269) (0.039) (0.137)
Age squared 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 *** -0.001
[0.001] [-0.001] [-.001] [-0.001]
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Female -0.210 ** 0.288 0.143 0.619 *
[-0.072] [0.077] [0.053] [0.174]
(0.099) (0.369) (0.102) (0.369)
Other pension arrangements -0.051 0.016 0.143 -0.479
[-0.017] [0.004] [0.045] [-0.131]
(0.098) (0.347) (0.101) (0.355)
Bequest -0.001 -0.011 * 0.001 0.010 *
[-0.001] [-0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Constant -0.606 -12.104 * -2.174 ** -0.170
(0.873) (6.643) (0.890) (3.119)
Log-likelihood -484.331 -39.671 -446.419 -40.402
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.201 0.022 0.129
N.Obs. 816 85 816 85
Max/min. annuity at age 29 (m) 60 (M) 39 (M) -
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in both rounds for Annuity = 1
and the lump sum choice in both rounds for Lump sum = 1
Specication Augmented : subsample 22-64
Specication Restricted: subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
** denotes signicant at 5-percent level; * denotes signicant at 10-percent level
29Table 7b: Annuity or lump sum choice and SSPs - probit estimates
Variable Annuity = 1 Lump sum = 1
Augm. Restr. Augm. Restr.
Coecient Coecient Coecient Coecient
[Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.] [Marg.e.]
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
SSP80 0.046 ** 0.037 -0.041 ** -0.189 **
[0.016] [0.010] [-0.013] [-0.052]
(0.021) (0.067) (0.021) (0.079)
Age -0.027 0.416 0.089 ** 0.0001
[-0.009] [0.110] [0.028] [0.000]
(0.038) (0.270) (0.039) (0.138)
Age squared 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 *** -0.001
[0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.000]
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.216 ** 0.312 0.174 * 0.559
[-0.074] [0.083] [0.055] [0.156]
(0.099) (0.368) (0.102) (0.368)
Other pension arrangements -0.044 0.040 0.140 -0.665 *
[-0.015] [0.011] [0.044] [-0.180]
(0.098) (0.356) (0.101) (0.387)
Bequest -0.001 -0.011 ** 0.001 0.010 *
[-0.001] [-0.003] [0.001] [.003]
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Constant -0.427 -11.969 * -2.198 ** -0.351
(0.859) (6.645) (0.878) (3.161)
Log-likelihood -484.995 -39.889 -445.936 -40.523
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.196 0.024 0.126
N.Obs. 816 85 816 85
Max/min. annuity at age 29 (m) 60 (M) 39 (M) -
The dependent variable is the annuity choice in both rounds for Annuity = 1
and the lump sum choice in both rounds for Lump sum = 1
Specication Augmented : subsample 22-64
Specication Restricted: subsample 22-64 restricted to those intending to bequeath
*** denotes signicant at 1-percent level
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Figure 1: Distributions of the SSPs.
Please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means \no chance at
all" and 10 means \absolutely certain"_
SSPXX How likely is it that you will attain (at least) the age of XX?
SSP75 is presented to people aged 16 thru 64
SSP80 is presented to people aged 16 thru 69
SSP85 is presented to people aged 65 thru 75
SSP90 is presented to people aged 70 thru 80
SSP95 is presented to people aged 75 thru 85
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Subjective survival probability Actuarial survival probability
Sources: DHS 2005 for subjective survival probabilities; CBS for actuarial survival probabilities
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Sources: DHS 2005 for subjective survival probabilities; CBS for actuarial survival probabilities
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Figure 2: Survival probabilities to reach 75 years - Actuarial vs. subjective.
321,000 euro per month 500 euro per month &
87,000 / 72,000 euros
QUESTION 1
1,000 euro per month 500 euro per month &
109,000 / 90,000 euros
QUESTION 2a
QUESTION 2b
1,000 euro per month 500 euro per month &
65,000 / 54,000 euros
Figure 3: Choice between annuity and (partial) lump sum payment.
Question 1 is asked to all respondents in the sample, irrespective of their working
status and for all ages. At this stage, the respondents are given a fair deal. The
lump sum payment is computed to be actuarially fair and thus the amount diers by
gender: Males are confronted with a payment of 87,000 euros, females with 72,000
euros. Depending on the answer given to this question, the respondents are asked
a follow-up question. Question 2a is given to the individuals who had preferred the
annuity in the rst round: the lump sum payments is made more attractive to them.
Question 2b is given to the individuals who had preferred the lump sum payment in
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Aged 55-64; SSP80
Age functions - Table 5
 
Figure 4: Age functions associated to the regressions in Table 5.
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